In fact, over the last 6 years we’ve seen a pell-mell rush into the sale of   derivative-based structured products with a fatwa wrap. These products are by   and large toxic waste, and the recent meltdown in global markets only magnified   the underlying mistruth about their application in nearly all institutional and   private client portfolios. Don’t blame the sharia scholars for these time bombs.   They are hired only to say whether the investment violates the rules and norms   of Islamic ethics. The responsibility for such wasteful investment schemes lays   entirely on the shoulders of bankers.
           
           Unlike the claims of our friends at   the Frankfurt conference, structured products are not a substitute for MPT   allocations. They never have been and never will be. Like Warren Buffet famously   said, derivatives are weapons of financial mass destruction.
           
           Yet that   didn’t stop many western banks and equally Islamic banks operating in the Middle   East from pushing hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars worth of   these products onto unsuspecting Arab clients. Muslim investors were coaxed into   thinking they were getting a responsive product with fatwa, yet in fact were   being peddled irresponsible trash that no professional would ever buy   himself.
           
           During the same period we saw an overwhelming consumption of   regional and international private equity, including private equity for real   estate, by investors in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. Why did this occur?   Well, firstly there was in fact a real need for professional venture capital to   be introduced into the developing economies of the GCC. But, what should have   been the normal evolution of a new, high-risk investment industry became instead   a stampede. From only two private equity houses in Arabia at the beginning of   the decade, we saw over 100 established by 2008.
           
           The abundance of so many   private equity houses in the region, plus a big push from foreign banks to sell   their own private equity deals, was too much for less-sophisticated investors.   They consumed them in vast amounts, in the process tilting the balance of MPT   allocations far too deeply into risky, illiquid assets.
           
           Now the chicken   has come home to roost. Investors everywhere—and not just in Arabia—indulged   themselves in the fantasy that somehow private equity provided less risk and   more reward than MPT. The cost is high. It hurt the biggest investors the most,   where private equity cash calls dried up liquidity. Now we have seen that an   overly amorous approach to this dangerous zone of the investment universe is   best taken in extreme moderation. It may be another generation before we see the   kind of over-investment in private equity that occurred during the last five or   six years.
           
           The great shame of today’s so-called Islamic asset management   industry is that there really is no such industry. Many claims being made about   the applicability of most Islamic products are generally false. No single major   bank or investment company has delivered a credible lineup of professionally   developed products that also meet the standards of sharia. Perhaps greed,   perhaps inertia, and perhaps ignorance are reasons for this unhealthy situation.   Certainly it is not a lack of resources. If major international and regional   banks dedicated themselves to MPT with fatwa, the situation could change   dramatically in short order.